

Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed April 22, 2026.

No. 3D26-0701
Lower Tribunal No. F93-9000A

Cedrick Craft,
Petitioner,

vs.

State of Florida,
Respondent.

Cases of Original Jurisdiction—Prohibition.

Cedrick Craft, in proper person.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, for respondent.

Before SCALES, C.J., and MILLER and GOODEN, JJ.

SCALES, C.J.

In 1994, Petitioner Cedrick Craft was convicted by a jury of attempted robbery with a deadly weapon and first-degree murder. He received a life

sentence with a twenty-five-year minimum mandatory term. This Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence in Craft v. State, 668 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). In the ensuing thirty years, Petitioner has filed multiple postconviction motions below and ten appeals in this Court, all of which have been unsuccessful.¹ Further, after Petitioner had engaged in numerous frivolous filings in the lower court, and after the trial court issued an order to show cause as to why Petitioner should not be prohibited from future *pro se* filings in the lower court, it entered a January 3, 2013 order barring Petitioner from further *pro se* filings below unless such filings are made by an attorney licensed to practice law in Florida (the "Order").

In this case, Petitioner's eleventh one in this Court, it appears self-represented Petitioner seeks to avoid the consequences of the Order by having this Court adjudicate motions without first seeking relief in the lower court. This Court declines Petitioner's invitation to adjudicate motions, in the first instance, that should be adjudicated in the trial court.

¹ Craft v. State, 289 So. 3d 900 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (3D19-0349); Craft v. State, 115 So. 3d 369 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (3D13-1222); Craft v. State, 46 So. 3d 1009 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (3D10-2463); Craft v. State, 23 So. 3d 1255 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (3D09-0170); Craft v. State, 979 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (3D08-0565); Craft v. State, 972 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (3D07-2556); Craft v. State, 944 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (3D05-2811); Craft v. State, 842 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (3D03-0268); Craft v. State, 685 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (3D96-2870); Craft v. State, 668 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (3D94-2657).

First, it appears Petitioner seeks an order from this Court compelling the trial court to adjudicate Petitioner's December 23, 2025 *pro se* motion, filed in violation of the Order, asserting his sentence was illegal. We treat this motion as a petition for a writ of mandamus and as an end-run challenge to the Order, and deny same.²

Second, while not entirely clear, it appears Petitioner is seeking an order from this Court discharging attorney Clayton Kaeiser as Petitioner's attorney of record. While the record appears to contain no order formally discharging attorney Kaeiser as Petitioner's counsel, the last "appearance" of attorney Kaeiser for Petitioner in the record is the February 2019 appeal from the trial court's denial of postconviction relief. Craft v. State, 289 So. 3d 900 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). To the extent that Petitioner seeks a formal order discharging attorney Kaeiser as counsel of record for Petitioner, we deny the Petitioner's request without prejudice to attorney Kaeiser filing a motion for a discharge order in the lower court, if he so desires.³

² Contrary to Petitioner's assertion, the submission of *pro se* motions on the Petitioner's behalf, here and below, by someone who is not a licensed member of the Florida Bar, does not satisfy the requirements of the Order.

³ To that end, the Clerk of this Court is directed to serve a copy of this order on attorney Kaeiser.

Third, to the extent that Petitioner is seeking in this Court an order appointing standby counsel (presumably for his December 23, 2025 post-conviction motion), plainly such a motion should be heard, in the first instance, in the lower court. We, therefore, strike Petitioner's request in this regard without prejudice to Petitioner first seeking such relief in the lower court so long as Petitioner's seeking such relief below complies with the Order.

Next, while not entirely clear, it appears Petitioner is seeking an order from this Court disqualifying the trial court. Again, it appears that, presumably because of the Order, Petitioner has not first filed a disqualification motion below. While we can, via the remedy of prohibition, disqualify a trial judge, our discretionary prohibition jurisdiction is generally exercised to review lower court orders denying a motion to disqualify. Nilio v. State, 386 So. 3d 191,192 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) ("A challenge to an order denying a motion to disqualify may be raised in a petition for writ of prohibition in accordance with the appellate rules, *or* it may be raised on direct appeal from the final judgment or order." (quoting Leveritt & Assocs., P.A. v. Williamson, 698 So. 2d 1316, 1318 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (emphasis added))). We decline to exercise our discretionary jurisdiction in this case to review and adjudicate

Petitioner's request to disqualify the trial court and, therefore, we dismiss Petitioner's request for trial court disqualification.

Also, it appears Petitioner seeks an order from this Court staying lower court proceedings while we adjudicate Petitioner's various motions. Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310(f) expressly contemplates this Court's role in granting stay relief to consist of *reviewing* orders entered by the lower court.⁴ Lacking any orders from the lower court, we decline to adjudicate Petitioner's request for stay relief in the first instance and strike that portion of Petitioner's request to this Court.

Finally, Petitioner seeks an order from this Court quashing the Order. The Order was entered on January 3, 2013. For this Court to have jurisdiction to review the Order, any appellate or certiorari challenge to the Order would have to have been filed with this Court within thirty days of the rendition of the Order. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.100(c)(1) (a petition for certiorari must "be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed."); Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(b) and 9.130(b) (establishing that jurisdiction of the

⁴ But see Sunbeam Television Corp. v. Clear Channel Metroplex, Inc., 117 So. 3d 772, 772-73 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (declining to adjudicate the movant's stay motion in the first instance but indicating that, in rare instances to preserve the status quo, an appellate court may grant stay relief in the first instance).

appellate court is invoked by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the lower court within thirty days of rendition of the order to be reviewed).⁵ We therefore dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction, Petitioner's request for us to review the Order.

This opinion conclusively disposes of the entirety of the relief Petitioner seeks in this case and this Court will not entertain any motion for rehearing directed to this order. Additionally, given Petitioner's seeming disregard for and abuse of the judicial process, Petitioner shall, within forty-five days of this Court's opinion, show cause why Petitioner should not be precluded from further *pro se* filings in this Court related to lower court case F93-9000A unless reviewed and signed by an attorney who is a duly licensed member of The Florida Bar in good standing. See State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47, 48 (Fla. 1999).

So ordered.

⁵ We need not, and therefore do not, opine as to the appropriate mechanism for a party subject to a trial court order barring further *pro se* filings to seek review of that order.