FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA
No. 1D2023-2977
CHUNMEI LIANG, L.M.T.,
Appellant,
v.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
Appellee.
On appeal from the Department of Health, Board of Massage Therapy. Allen Hall, Executive Director.
January 23, 2025
PER CURIAM.
Appellant Chunmei Liang appeals the final order by the Florida Board of Massage Therapy (“Board”) revoking her license to practice massage therapy. She argues that the Board abused its discretion by deviating from the disciplinary guidelines and applying an aggravating factor without factual support.
Liang was the owner and designated establishment manager of a licensed massage establishment. The Department of Health (“Department”) filed an administrative complaint with the Board, charging Liang with violating section 480.046(1)(p), Florida Statutes (2021), which provides that violating any provision of

Liang was subject to penalties under rule 64B7–30.002(2)(f) for “[a]iding, assisting, procuring, or advising any unlicensed person to practice massage contrary to the provisions of Chapter 480.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 64B7–30.002(2)(f). If the violation is the first offense, the penalty is suspension. Id. Upon a subsequent offense, the penalty range is “[s]uspension and $2,500 fine to revocation and $2,500 fine.” Id. But the Board deviated from the recommended penalty for a first offense and revoked Liang’s license based on an aggravating factor—the “deterrent effect of the penalty imposed” under rule 64B7–30.002(3)(f).
To impose a penalty outside the disciplinary guidelines, the Board was required make “[a] specific finding in the final order of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.” § 456.079(3), Fla. Stat. Meaning, as explained in Brewer v. Fla. Dep’t of Health, Bd. of Nursing, 268 So. 3d 871, 874 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019), that the Board must find that the record supports application of a particular aggravating factor. See also Aleong v. Dep’t of Bus. and Pro. Regul., 16 So. 3d 190, 193 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (explaining that finding a licensee was previously on probation may support the aggravating factor of deterrent effect).
The record contains no facts to support application of the aggravating factor of “deterrent effect of the penalty imposed.” Because Liang proceeded to an informal hearing and admitted the factual allegations in the complaint, the only facts before the Board were those it adopted in the complaint. And the complaint alleged only that Liang aided an unlicensed person in practicing massage therapy. Without facts supporting application of a mitigating or aggravating factor, the Board was required to impose a penalty under disciplinary guidelines provided under rule 64B7–30.002(2). Because no competent, substantial evidence supports the aggravating factor applied, the Board abused its discretion by deviating from the guidelines and revoking Liang’s license. Therefore, we set aside the Board’s revocation order and remand to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See § 120.68(7), Fla. Stat.
SET ASIDE AND REMANDED.
ROWE and LONG, JJ., concur; KELSEY, J., concurs in result.
Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
Bernard M. Cassidy of Lubell & Rosen, Fort Lauderdale, for Appellant.
Sarah Young Hodges, Chief Appellate Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellee.