Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed August 27, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
No. 3D26-0449
Lower Tribunal No. F11-24631B
Glenn Jackson, Appellant,
vs.
State of Florida, Appellee.
An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Carlos H. Gamez, Judge.
Law Offices of Matthew Karim, PLLC, and Matthew Z. Karim (Ft. Lauderdale), for appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Richard L. Polin, Chief Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before FERNANDEZ, MILLER, and LOBREE, JJ.
PER CURIAM
Affirmed. See § 90.202(6), Fla. Stat. (2025) (“A court may take judicial notice of . . . [r]ecords of any court of this state or of any court of record of the United States or of any state, territory, or jurisdiction of the United States.”); Cueto v. State, 979 So. 2d 1113, 1115 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (acknowledging that courts may take judicial notice of prior court records and, “after reviewing the record on appeal and taking judicial notice of various documents involved in the case,” finding sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conviction); Pankhurst v. State, 796 So. 2d 618, 620 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (“If the trial court elects to impose a habitual offender sentence, it need not make specific findings that a habitual offender sentence is necessary for the protection of the public, as was required prior to the 1988 amendments to the habitual offender statute. The trial court may simply impose any sentence provided for in the statute.”); § 775.084(3)(a)6., Fla. Stat. (2011) (“[T]he court must sentence the defendant as a habitual felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender, subject to imprisonment pursuant to this section unless the court finds that such sentence is not necessary for the protection of the public. If the court finds that it is not necessary for the protection of the public to sentence the defendant as a habitual felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender, the court shall provide written reasons . . . .”); Marion v. State, 582 So. 2d 115, 116 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (“The date of the original offense determines the applicable
statute for sentencing.”).